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Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the
Nature of Criminal Culpability
Anthony M. Dillof
[Als so often, the abnormal will throw light on the normal.
J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excusest
I. INTRODUCTION
A central question of criminal law theory is what moral
theory underlies the criminal law. For a moral theory to
underlie the criminal law, it would have to imply the core
prohibitions and sanction-structure of the criminal law,
explain in moral terms well-established but noncore ele-
ments of the criminal law, and generate moral arguments
to vindicate or reform penumbral elements. A moral theory
for the criminal law thus would be in turn faithful, illumi-
nating and inspiring.
One way to search for such a theory would be through
direct inquiry. One could consider a paradigm crime and
ask why it, morally speaking, should be a crime. The trou-
ble with this approach is that it is likely to yield too many
answers. There are too many moral theories that justify
criminalizing, for example, A's forcible taking of B's prop-
erty. Robbery is too easy a crime to be theoretically interest-
ing. A second approach to identifying the moral basis of the
criminal law is more oblique. One could consider aberra-
tional fact patterns that have provoked conflicting moral
* Associtate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law.
A.B. 1981 Harvard University; J.D. 1985, Columbia University School of Law;
LL.M. 1996, Columbia university School of Law. I am grateful to Douglas Husak
and Scott J. Shapiro for their valuable feedback and thoughtful comments on
drafts of this article.
t J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSES IN THE
CRIMINAL LAW 3, 7 (Michael Louis Corrado ed., 1994).
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analyses. Having resolved the conflict over such aberra-
tional cases, one hopefully would be in a better position to
understand the general case.' To let method foreshadow
subject matter, one might say that according to this latter
approach, the inquiry trains its sights upon one thing (the
aberrational) and ends up hitting another (the general).
This article shall adopt this latter approach.
This article pursues the approach sketched above by
considering the doctrine of transferred intent. This doctrine
invites study because it treats a relatively aberrational fact
pattern in a manner that has provoked sharp disagreement.
A attempts to harm B and harms C instead. This fact pat-
tern is aberrational in the sense that, as a purely empirical
matter, it is likely less common for A, attempting to harm
B, to harm a third party, C, than either to succeed and
harm B or to fail and harm nobody at all. The fact pattern
is also aberrational in the sense that the double departures
from A's design seem to offset, rather than reinforce, each
other: A's unexpected failure to harm B, and unexpected
harming of C, filfills A's expectation of causing harm. What
A's criminal liability should be has provoked conflicting
judgments. Pursuant to the doctrine of transferred intent,
A's intent to harm B is treated as the intent to harm C,
with liability to follow accordingly. Thus, where A, intend-
ing to kill B, kills C, A may be liable for murder. Commen-
tators have characterized the doctrine as "defect[ive],' "an
arbitrary exception to normal principles,"' a "curious sur-
vival of the antique law,"' "theoretically incoherent,"' "[to]
be rejected,"' "overly harsh,"' and having "no proper place
1. A similar approach to theorizing about the criminal law is illustrated by
George Fletcher's Blackmail, The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1617
(1993).
2. Wilfred J. Ritz, Felony Murder, Transferred Intent, and the Palsgraf
Doctrine in the Criminal Law, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 169,172 (1969).
3. GLANVILLE WIIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 134 (2d ed.
1961).
4. William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX L. REV. 650,650 (1967).
5. Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of
Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635,712 (1993).
6. DON STUART, CANADIAN CRIUINAL LAW 196 (1982).
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in criminal law!'8 A roughly equal number of commenta-
tors, however, have approved of the doctrine and its result.9
The controversy concerning transferred intent is alive.
What is its basis and how should it be resolved?
I shall argue against the moral soundness of the doctrine
of transferred intent. In brief, the doctrine is inconsistent
with the general principle that actors should not be pun-
ished based on the unintended results of their actions
(absent some other basis for culpability such as knowledge
or recklessness), and harm to an unintended victim is an
unintended result in the morally relevant sense. Any posi-
tion to the contrary must either characterize A's intentions
in an artificially abstract way or offer a shallow and unsat-
isfying view of the nature of punishment. Furthermore, the
doctrine of transferred intent is inconsistent with the view
of duty, predominant in tort law, that duties run to indi-
viduals, not to the world at large. This view is an attractive
one and applies with equal force to criminal law.
Although I criticize the doctrine of transferred intent,
the aim of this article is not wholly negative. Understand-
ing the particular moral failing of the doctrine of trans-
ferred intent allows us to better understand the moral
strength of the criminal law generally. This strength is its
commitment to punishing for the culpable causing of harm
to individuals. This article concludes that any moral theory
7. David J. Karp, Note, Causation in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1249, 1268-69 (1978).
8. ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 921 (3d ed. 1982).
9. See J.C. SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIuYINAL LAW 73-75 (2d ed. 1969);
Clifford Hall, A Defense of the Doctrine of Transferred Malice: Its Place in the
Nigerian Criminal Code, 34 INTL & COMP. L.Q. 805 (1985); Douglas N. Husak,
Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 65 (1996); Kimberly
D. Kessler, Comment, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
2183, 2206-11 (1994); see also Michael N. Moore, Intentions and Mens Rea, in
ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY: THE INFLUENCE OF H.LA. HART
245, 263-68 (Ruth Gavison ed., 1987) (underlying theory of doctrine "seems neither
incoherent nor incorrect"); Lawrence Crocker, A Retributive Theory of Criminal
Causation, J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 65, 81 (1994) (weakly endorsing the
doctrine of transferred intent).
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of the criminal law must give a central place to this com-
mitment.
II. THE MEANING OF TRANSFERRED INTENT
The doctrine of transferred intent (TI) dates back to the
16th century.1 Although no standard formulation of the
doctrine exists,' its core implications are clear. Imagine
that A, intending to kill B, shoots at B, misses, and hits C, a
bystander, killing her. Call this the Basic Case. Under TI, A
at a minimum would be liable for murder, notwithstanding
the fact that he did not intend to kill C.' The mens rea
element for murder would be deemed satisfied by A's in-
tention to kill B. Absent TI, the mens rea element for mur-
der might not be satisfied and A then would be liable for
only the attempted murder of B and perhaps some lesser
offense with respect to C.
A few qualifications and clarifications must be made at
this point. First, although the Basic Case perhaps best il-
lustrates TI, TI-as I shall use it-is not limited to killings.
Rather, it is a general principle which permits liability for
any crime involving a mens rea of intent-be it arson, as-
sault, theft or trespass-where the actual object of the
crime is not the intended object. Furthermore, although I
shall mostly be interested in crimes of intent, TI seems to
imply analogous doctrines of transferred knowledge, reck-
lessness, and negligence. This generalized understanding of
TI is captured in subdivisions 2.03(2)(a) and 2.03(3)(a) of
the Model Penal Code. With respect to intention ("purpose"
is the M.P.C.'s term) and knowledge, subdivision 2.03(2)(a)
provides for liability where "the actual result differs from
that designed or contemplated, as the case may be, only in
10. See Regina v. Saunders & Archer, 2 Plowd. 473, 75 Eng. Rep. 706 (1576);
Regina v. Salisbury, 1 Plowd. 100, 75 Eng. Rep. 158 (1553). See generally Prosser,
supra note 4, at 652-58 (discussing origin and scope of doctrine).
11. See Husak, supra note 9, at 66 n.8.
12. Strictly, A would only be prima facie liable for murder because he might
have a justification or excuse available. In my discussion, I shall assume that such
defenses are unavailable.
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the respect that a different person or different property is
injured or affected."3 Section 2.03(3)(a) of the Model Penal
Code contains similar language regarding recklessness and
negligence. Thus, the essence of TI is that the identity of
the object of the crime does not matter.'
Second, by TI, I refer to any positive legal device for
achieving liability of the type described above. Subsection
2.03(2) is one possible device for achieving such liability.
Some jurisdictions accomplish the same end in other ways.
With respect to murder, for example, some states establish
liability for unintended victims through a statutory defini-
tion that explicitly indicates that the person killed need not
be the intended victim.' Other jurisdictions utilize malice
13. Subsection 2.03(2) of the Model Penal Code is curiously drafted. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (Official Draft 1962). The commentaries explicitly
indicate subdivision (a) is supposed to cover bystander-shooting scenarios such as
the Basic Case. Id. commentary at 260 n.14. Yet in bystander-shooting cases, the
actual result arguably does not differ from that designed or contemplated "only in
the respect that a different person or different property is injured." The result-a
death-also differs in that it occurs at a different place, and by a slightly different
mode--a bullet blown off-course by the wind, say. A case in which, strictly
speaking, only the person was different would be where the perpetrator was
mistaken about the identity of the person who he shot. The language of
subdivision (b), which merely requires that "the actual result involves the same
kind of injury or harm as that design [and is not too remote]" seems to fit
bystander-shootings better than that of (a). It will not do to attempt to construe
subsection (a) more broadly to include bystander shootings. It might be argued
that "result," as used in subdivision (a) should be read not to include place or mode
of result, so that in a bystander-shooting case, the "actual result7--C's death-
would only differ from that intended-B's death-in that a different person is
killed. But such a reading would allow subdivision (a) also to cover cases where
the bystander is killed by modes that defy the requirement of proximate causation.
If some variation in mode is allowed by subdivision (a), what is the limit? Only
subdivision (b) contains language ("not too remote or accidental") to rule out cases
where the proximate cause requirement is not met. This language would better
appear in subdivision (1)(h) where it would have broader scope.
14. This broad statement, of course, assumes that there are no significant
differences between the actual and intended victim that might affect liability such
as whether the actual or intended victim enjoys heightened or diminished legal
protection. For example, if the intended victim is a police officer and- the actual
victim is not, there would be no liability for shooting a police officer.
15. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993) ("A person who
kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in
performing the acts which cause the death ... he either intends to kill or do great
bodily harm to that individual or another... ."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
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aforethought or depraved heart formulations,"6 which will
produce the same result because the intent to kill A demon-
strates malice or a depraved heart. The felony-murder rule
also may produce the same result because attempted mur-
der may serve as a predicate felony. I will not be concerned
with the form of the mechanisms by which different juris-
dictions incorporate TI. Nor will I be concerned with the
question whether in a particular jurisdiction, TI, formu-
lated as a separate supplementary doctrine, is superfluous
and should thus be rejected on doctrinal grounds. 7 My fo-
cus is the moral, not the doctrinal, soundness of TI.
Third, by TI, I refer to a doctrine with a strong propor-
tionality requirement. The notion of intent being
"transferred" is usually derided as fiction. Yet this fiction is
a useful device for ensuring that punishment is propor-
tional to moral culpability. If A's intent to kill B is trans-
ferred to C, it is no longer available to support A's liability
for the attempted murder of B. In contrast, if TI rendered A
liable for murdering C, but did not negate his liability for
the attempted murder of B, A's total punishment for mur-
der and attempted murder would be disproportionate to his
culpability. A should not be punished more than the stan-
dard murderer. The standard murderer would not be liable
for attempted murder because murder and attempted mur-
der are usually merged.' In the Basic Case, there would not
necessarily be a merger of offenses because the attempted
(McKinney 1989) ("A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when...
[w]ith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such
person or of a third person....").
16. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1986) ("Murder is the unlawful
killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-2-1 (Michie 1994) ("Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human
being by another... by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating
a depraved mind regardless of human life."). With respect to other crimes, such as
assault, a state may have to resort to invoking a general doctrine of TI because
assault is not defined as "the causing of injury to the person intended or anotherO
or "the causing of injury with malice aforethought."
17. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRnNAL LAW 108 (1987)
(criticizing TI on these grounds).
18. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1).
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murder of B is not technically a lesser included offense of
the murder of C. Exposing A to greater liability would be
unjust because the penalty for murder is presumptively the
greatest appropriate for a person who intentionally kills
another. A greater penalty would produce disproportionate
punishments in much the way that the felony-murder rule
does. Under the felony-murder rule, a felon would be sub-
jected to the additional liability for murder without any
necessary increase in his culpability. Indeed, if under TI A
were also liable for attempted murder, TI would simply be a
special case of the felony-murder rule, where attempted
murder was allowed to serve as a predicate felony. The fel-
ony-murder rule has been roundly criticized for permitting
punishment disproportionate to culpability."9 If TI permit-
ted liability for the attempt as well as the completed of-
fense, it would be subject to the same criticism. The as-
sumption that under TI A will not be liable for attempted
murder of B is not necessarily consistent with existing
law." Nevertheless, adopting this assumption renders TI
more morally defensible. Accordingly, because I believe that
TI is unjust even if proportionality requirements are not
violated, I shall assume that in the Basic Case there is no
liability for attempted murder.
Finally, I explicitly adopt an assumption held by most
commentators who have opined on the justness of TI. That
assumption is that TI makes a difference in sentencing out-
come. To simplify discussion, I posit that in the Basic Case,
A acts neither intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negli-
gently with respect to the death of C."' A, we might imag-
19. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A
Study of the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429,
1431 n.9 (1994) (citing extensive literature critical of the felony-murder rule).
20. In People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 292-94 (Cal. 1996), the only case that
appears to have addressed the issue specifically, the Supreme Court of California,
with one justice dissenting, held that a person could be simultaneously convicted
for attempted murder and murder on facts analogous to the Basic Case.
21. If A is reckless the analysis becomes more complicated. In that case, one
might wonder whether the penalty for murder, pursuant to TI, is greater than the
combined penalties for attempted murder (with respect to B) and manslaughter
(with respect to C), which would occur in the absence of the doctrine. There seems
1998] 507
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ine, shoots at B on an apparently unpopulated desert island
and C is standing behind a wall of bushes near B when she
is shot. Thus, without TI, A would be liable for only the at-
tempted murder of B; with TI, A is liable for murder only.
For TI to have any bite, there must be a difference between
the sentences that might be imposed for murder and at-
tempted murder. A greater potential sentence for murder
than attempted murder is a feature of most criminal
codes.' For most of my discussion, I will assume that the
greater punishment for completed offenses is a deeply
imbedded feature of the criminal law. Thus, the central is-
sue of this inquiry may be stated as: Where the criminal
law systematically treats completed offenses more harshly
than unsuccessful attempts, should TI be employed so that
an otherwise unsuccessful attempt is treated like a com-
pleted offense?
III. A VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF CRIMINAL CULPABILITY
The debate concerning the justness of TI may usefully be
set in a historical context. As discussed below, the history of
the development of culpability in law displays in rough out-
line a movement toward requiring an ever tighter nexus
between actual and intended results.
In the beginning, criminal law cared little about inten-
tions. The notion of mens rea, or "guilty mind," did not en-
ter law until the early thirteenth century.' Prior to this
time, strict liability was often the rule, and so any intention
to be no necessary reason why this should be so. In cases where it is not, applying
TI thus would result in a lesser penalty. If, however, A's recklessness with respect
to C is simultaneously "transferred" to B so that A is liable for murder plus
reckless endangerment, a good argument can be made that this combination will
produce a greater combined penalty. It takes only rudimentary algebra to
demonstrate that, if desert is a proportional function of culpability and harm,
greater aggregate desert will obtain if the higher culpability is applied to the
greater harm and the lesser culpability to the lesser harm than if the higher
culpability is applied to the lesser harm and the lesser culpability is applied to the
greater harm.
22. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. ScOnT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW 59-60 (1986).
23. See Gardner, supra note 5, at 642.
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or no intention would do.2' This severe standard may well
have rested on practical concerns of avoiding private ven-
dettas, rather than on a developed moral theory according
to which intention was irrelevant. ' Nevertheless, it sug-
gests that intention, compared to injury, was a latecomer to
the law.
The jurist most associated with the introduction of mens
rea into the criminal law is Henry Bracton. A cleric as well
as a judge, Bracton wrote, "a crime is not committed unless
the intention to injure exists. ' The requisite intention to
injure, however, was not defined with great care. It appears
that any fault on the part of the actor would be sufficient.'
Accordingly, Bracton has been understood as adopting the
canonist doctrine of versanti in re illicitae imputantur om-
nia guae sequntur ox delicto: one acting unlawfully is held
responsible for all the consequences of his conduct. ' The
consequences of such a doctrine may be harsh, as the harm
for which an actor is held liable may be disproportionate to
the actor's moral culpability. Bracton's versanti principle
thus exemplifies what Professor Michael Moore has de-
scribed as "a kind of crude forfeiture theory, whereby once a
defendant has crossed some threshold of culpability we
should not care about making any further discriminations
in degree of culpability. ' The vestiges of such an approach
24. Id. at 642-43, 652 n.70 (finding consensus of scholars that primitive
English law operated on essentially a strict liability basis). According to Professor
Sayre, "What the recorded fragments of early law seem to show is that a criminal
intent was not always essential for criminality and many malefactors were
convicted on proof of causation without proof of any intent to harm." Francis E.
Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974, 982 (1932). Professor Sayre, however,
notes that "at least with respect to some crimes," intent was relevant. Id.
25. Gardner, supra note 5, at 651.
26. HENRY D. BRACTON, ON THE LAw AND CusroMs OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel
E. Thorne trans., 1968)
27. See Gardner, supra note 5, at 655-56 (discussing Bracton's example of a
master who flogs his pupil "improperly" and so is liable for homicide even if the
pupil's death was unintended).
28. Stanislaw Frankowski, Mens Rea and Punishment in England: In Search
of Interdependence of the Two Basic Components of Criminal Liability (A
Historical Perspective), 63 U. DErr. L. REV. 393, 412 (1986).
29. Moore, supra note 9, at 266.
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may be found in today's felony-murder rule. According to
this rule, once an actor has "crossed the line" by committing
a felony, he is thereby liable for murder if his action has
resulted in a death. Bracton's versanti principle would be
functionally equivalent to a "felony-felony" rule.
A pair of 19th century cases established a significant
tightening of the requisite nexus between evil intent and
harm caused. In Regina v. Pembliton, the defendant was
charged with malicious damage to property when a stone he
had thrown at another person struck and broke a window."
In Regina v. Faulkner, the defendant was charged with ar-
son for causing a fire that destroyed a ship in the course of
trying to steal property from it." In each case, the defen-
dant had a criminally wrongful intent. Yet in each case, the
court held that the intention was not sufficient to establish
liability for the charged offense. Rather than accepting any
improper intention, the courts required that the defendant
have a guilty mind with respect to the type of harm prohib-
ited.
The next step in tightening the nexus between intention
and result would be to require the intention to cause not
merely the same type of harm as that intended, but the
same instance of harm as that intended. This in fact is the
approach taken in German and Nigerian law, which reject
TI." The question is whether this further step can be mor-
ally justified.
IV. THE MERITS OF TRANSFERRED INTENT
A Accidents, Mistakes and Concurrence
Perhaps the most basic criticism of TI is that it estab-
lishes an inappropriately high level of liability for occur-
30. Regina v. Pembliton, 2 L.R.-Cr. Cas. Res. 119, 12 Cox C.C. 607 (1874).
31. Regina v. Faulkner, [1877] LR. 8, 13 Cox C.C. 550 (Ireland).
32. See HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS:
ALLGEMEINER TEiL 281 n.74 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing majority and minority
positions); NIGERIAN CIIT. CODE § 24 (1990). See also CYPRIAN 0. OKONKWO &
MICHAEL E. NAISH, CRIMINAL LAW IN NIGERIA 52-53, 80-84 (2d ed. 1980); but cf
Hall, supra note 9 (arguing issue open and TI should be accepted).
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rences that are accidental. According to a leading treatise
on Canadian criminal law, "[i]t is submitted that the doc-
trine of transferred [intent] should be rejected... The dan-
ger is that we might end up punishing a mere accident."' It
seems clear that in the Basic Case, we would say that C
was killed "by accident" or "accidentally" despite the fact
that A was trying to kill B. There is no awkwardness in
saying, "while in the process of trying to kill B, A acciden-
tally killed C." It is less clear, however, how this fact entails
that A should not be treated as harshly a murderer. Acci-
dents do not wear their normative implications on their
sleeve. This section seeks to develop a fuller argument for
the claim that A's punishment for causing C's death should
be decreased because "it was (only) an accident."
1. How Accidents Exculpate
Claims of accident may be used to deny, or at least di-
minish, responsibility for an occurrence. Claims of accident
may accomplish this in a variety of ways. Sometimes lack of
agency is the basis of the denial. Imagine that Sally is
cleaning her revolver when a sudden crack of thunder star-
tles her, causing her hand to tighten on the trigger, the re-
volver to discharge, and Tom's window to be thereby shat-
tered. In this case, Sally may argue that her shooting out of
the window was merely an accident; she shouldn't be
blamed because the thunder caused her to squeeze the trig-
ger. In law, the requirement of a voluntary act might be
invoked.' Clearly, the Basic Case does not involve an acci-
dent in this sense of the word. Or suppose that Mike shoots
at an elephant, the bullet misses, and through an unlikely
set of ricochets, the bullet hits Rita who was standing be-
hind Mike. Here too, Mike, to avoid blame, might say that
Rita's injury was an accident. In law, we would explain that
Mike should not be held liable for shooting Rita on the
ground that the manner in which it occurred was so freak-
33. STUART, supra note 6, at 196-97.
34. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01.
1998]
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ish that there was no proximate causation.' The Basic
Case, however, does not involve an accident in this sense of
accident either. Imagine a variation on the Basic Case-the
Risk Case-in which the only difference is that A is in-
formed that due to normal wind conditions, there is a sub-
stantial risk that his shot will miss B and hit a bystander,
C. A shoots at B, there is a minor gust of wind, and C is hit
and killed. In the Risk Case, even the critic of TI, who be-
lieves A should be punished less than a murderer, will want
to hold A liable for manslaughter with respect to C. The
gust of wind would not be considered an intervening cause
precluding liability. Thus, in asserting that C's death is a
mere accident that should not be grounds for treating A as
a murderer, the critic of TI is not alleging an insufficient
causal connection between A's firing and C's death.
The sense of accident that I think best fits the Basic
Case is accident as an unintended result. Where a result
diverges from that intended, we often describe the actual
result as an accident. We might, for example, imagine A
subsequently explaining to the police, "It was an accident-
I didn't mean to shoot C." Intentions are undeniably a basis
for ascribing moral responsibility and blame. As note ear-
lier, in the Basic Case, A is assumed not to have acted
knowingly, recklessly or negligently with respect to A's
death. Having eliminated intentionality, the fourth major
basis of moral culpability, the critic of TI may conclude that
C' death is not relevant to determining what punishment A
deserves.
2. Accidents v. Mistakes
The critic of TI who points out that C's death was acci-
dental, however, cannot rest with the claim that A did not
intend to kill C. Sometimes an actor clearly should be liable
35. It might also be said that C's death occurred by chance, rather than by
accident. See D.W. Theobold, Accident and Chance, 45 PHIL. 106 (1970)
(distinguishing accidental and chance occurrences). See also DONALD DAVIDSON,
Freedom to Act, in ESSAYS ON ACIONS AND EVENTS 78 (1980) (claiming that where
lack of proximity, agent did not cause result intentionally).
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for murder despite not having intended to kill the person
whom she did. Consider the Mistake Case. A mistakenly
believes that B is the person standing on the corner; A
shoots at this person, killing him; the person who was
standing on the corner, however, turns out to be C. Even
those who reject TI are not tempted to hold that A should
not be liable for murder on the ground that he intended to
kill B, not kill C.' The distinction between accidents and
mistakes is a familiar one.37 Nevertheless, the moral sig-
nificance of the distinction is not obvious. Both claims of
accident and mistake may sometimes excuse or mitigate
blame. Furthermore, from a more detached perspective, the
distinction between accidents and mistakes may seem su-
perficial: An accident may be described as simply an occur-
rence based on the mistaken belief that the conditions
causing the accident would not obtain; a mistake may be
described as simply the result of an accident that occurs in
the process of belief formation. A central challenge for any
critic of TI, therefore, is to distinguish between unintended
results that arise through accident, as in the Basic Case,
which allegedly exculpate, and unintended results that
arise through mistake, as in the Mistake Case, which are
not at all exculpatory.'
The moral difference between accidents and mistakes
may be seen by stepping back for a moment to attend to the
manner in which inculpation occurs. An actor, it may be
argued, is prima facie responsible for a harmful conse-
quence of his action when the consequence is intended.' In
36. See JESCRECK, supra note 32, at 281.
37. See Austin, supra note t, at 28 n.2.
38. This need to distinguish cases of accident and mistake is not always
appreciated. In Karp, supra note 7, the author implies that an actor's achieving of
his 'basic objective" is a prerequisite for liability. Id. at 1270. Whether an actor
who through mistake kills a person she did not intend should be able to avoid
liability based on her failure to achieve her "basic objective" is not discussed.
39. See Moore, supra note 9, at 268 n.46. Moore writes: "Tht concurrence
principle holds that [for there to be liability based on intentions] the defendant
must have caused a particular harm that instantiates the type of harm intended."
As I will argue, see section IVA3 supra, this principle is best understood as
requiring the instantiation of the type of harm strictly intended.
5131998]
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the context of criminal law, Professor Michael Moore has
called this principle of liability the Concurrence Principle
because intention and result are required to concur.' The
Concurrence Principle may seem implausibly narrow. After
all, there are many examples of cases involving divergent
intentions and results where we believe the actor should be
held as accountable as if there were no divergence. Here are
two examples: (1) Unintended Manner of Injury Case: A
intends to kill B by shooting him in the head, but because of
a gust of wind, shoots him in the heart killing him; (2) Un-
intended Degree of Injury Case: A intending to kill B by
shooting him merely wounds him. In these cases, we believe
A should be held as responsible for killing B and wounding
B as if there had been no divergence between actual and
intended results. To accommodate these cases, the Concur-
rence Principle should not be construed so narrowly that it
establishes liability only where all aspects of a consequence
are intended. Rather, it should be construed as establishing
liability for any aspects of a consequence that are intended.
For example, in the Unintended Manner of Injury Case,
although A did not intent to shoot B in the heart, he did
intend to kill him, which in fact occurred. Thus, pursuant to
the Concurrence Principle, A should be held liable for kill-
ing B, even if A should not be liable for shooting B in the
heart. Likewise, in the Unintended Degree of Injury Case,
although A did not intend to wound B, he intended to injure
B, which occurred, and so should be liable for assault.
Exculpatory pleas of accident and exculpatory pleas of
mistake respond to the Concurrence Principle in different
ways. In the case of mistakes, the actor is admitting the
existence of the concurrence, but distancing himself from
the concurring intention on the ground that it rested upon a
mistaken belief that was reasonable to hold and that rea-
40. Moore's Concurrence Principle should not be confused with another
criminal law principle with the same name. According to this principle, the
culpable mental state of the actor defendant must have actuated the physical
conduct the actor is charged with performing. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 22,
at 377.
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sonably generated the intention at issue. For example, the
Police Officer might say,
Yes, I shot him. It wasn't an accident. I saw him
point at me what I believed to be a gun and, on that
basis, decided to shoot him. It seems I was mistaken;
it was a water pistol. But if you saw that shape
pointed at you, you would have tried to shoot him
yourself.
In the Mistake Case, the Concurrence Principle is satisfied
because A both intended to kill the person standing on the
corner and did kill the person standing on the corner. The
assertion of mistake is not exculpatory because A cannot
distance himself from the intention to shoot the person on
the corner. Although it might have been reasonable to be-
lieve that B was the person on the corner, it was not rea-
sonable to form the intention to kill that person based on
that belief. In contrast, in the case of accidents, the actor is
denying that he ever held the intention that is alleged to
concur with the result. Thus, the Police Officer might say,
"It was an accident. I never intended to shoot the bystander
I hit. I just aimed poorly at the fleeing felon." Likewise, in
the Basic Case, A can plead that not only did he not intend
to shoot C, he did not intend to shoot the person who was
located where B was. Thus, the critic of TI is able to explain
why A should not be held accountable for C's death even if
A in the Mistake Case should be. In the Basic Case, there is
no concurrence between intention and result; in the Mis-
take Case, there is.
3. Alternative Descriptions of Intentions
The previous section demonstrated that in determining
culpability, it is important how a result is described. In the
Mistake Case, only when C's death was described as "the
death of the man on the corner" could the Concurrence
Principle be successfully invoked against A. The question
naturally arises whether in the Basic Case, C's death can be
described in a manner that would create liability under the
Concurrence Principle. It is sometimes argued that in the
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Basic Case, A should be treated as harshly as a murderer
because A intended to "kill someone" and did "kill some-
one.""' Thus (the argument goes) there is the requisite con-
currence between that which was intended and that which
occurred.
At this point, it is helpful to distinguish between two
senses of intention. We may be said to generally believe the
logical consequences of our beliefs (assuming we are ra-
tional and the matter involved is not too complicated). Thus
if Al believes that the Mets will win the World Series in
1999, he believes that either the Mets or the Yankees will
win the series in 1999. (P implies (P or Q)). Analogously, we
may be said to intend the logical consequences of our in-
tentions.' Imagine that Al is thirsty, intends to drink some
water, sees a glass of water nearby, intends to reach it,
reaches for it, grasps it and drinks it. Al of course believes
that in every world in which he grasps the glass, he either
grasps the glass of water or eats a cracker. Thus, in intend-
ing to bring about a world in which he grasps the glass of
water, Al intends to bring about a world in which he either
grasps a glass of water or eats a cracker. (All worlds in the
first group are worlds in the latter group). We may say Al
"derivatively intends" that he grasps a glass of water or
eats a cracker, because this intention derives from the logi-
cally prior intention to grasp a glass of water. The ascrip-
tion of a derivative intention to a person is a pretty trivial
matter. Indeed, by the previous line of reasoning, we could
have equally well ascribed to Al the intention to grasp the
glass of water or stand on his head, or even the intention to
grasp a glass of water and not eat a cracker. In contrast, the
41. See Hall, supra note 9, at 810 ("If the accused intended to kill one person
but killed another, then his general objective has been achieved since he intended
to kill and did kill"); Crim. L. Comm'rs, 4th Rep't, PARL. PAP. xix-254 (1839) ("[he
intended to kill and did kill; whether, therefore, the crime be estimated by the
intention or the result, its magnitude cannot be affected by the consideration that
the mischief did not light where it was intended").
42. JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONAL1TY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
MIND 79-83, 103 (1983) (comparing intentions and beliefs and discussing whether
we intend the consequences of our intentions).
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intention to grasp a glass of water may be called a "strict
intention." This intention is not ascribable to Al merely be-
cause it is a logical consequence of another of Al's inten-
tions. Rather, this is a core intention that guided Al's ac-
tion, that caused him to reach out his hand for the glass,
and that explained his behavior. It is this intention which,
if Al were asked to write out the chain of practical reason-
ing that led him to extend his hand, would be among the
links in the chain. The object of strict intentions need not be
intrinsically desired. Although Al strictly intended to grasp
the glass, grasping the glass was only desired as a means to
Al's ultimate end of satisfying his thirst.'
Returning to the Basic Case, we see that A's intention to
kill a person is a derivative intention. It may be ascribed to
A merely because in intending to kill B, A perforce intends
to kill a person. The intention to kill a person, however, nei-
ther guides A's action, explains his behavior, nor caused A
to shoot at the person on the corner. If the intention to kill a
person had been a strict intention, A would likely have
acted very differently. Imagine A is a psychotic killer who
simply wants to kill somebody or a would-be gang member
who must kill someone (it doesn't matter who) to complete
his initiation. In these cases where A strictly intends to kill
someone, A might have shot the first person he saw that
day, or shot into a crowd, or waited until he encountered a
particularly vulnerable person. In contrast, in the Mistake
Case, the intention to shoot the person on the corner is a
strict intention. It explains why A positioned himself with a
view of the corner, aimed his rifle as he did, and explains
his feeling of satisfaction as he sees the person on the cor-
ner crumple." Thus, we may generally say: In cases of acci-
43. This usage of "strict intention" is consistent with the general use of
"intention" and the criminal laws use. A contract killer, for example, will be held
liable for intentionally killing another even if the only reason for the killing was to
collect a fee.
44. There are alternative, albeit slightly less intuitive, ways of describing A's
intentions such that the Concurrence Principle is satisfied. Imagine that A
believes that B is left-handed and that C, A's actual victim, happens to be left-
handed. In that case, one might correctly say that A intends to kill a left-handed
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dent, none of an actor's strict intentions are realized; in
cases of mistake, although the actor's intrinsic intentions
may be defeated, at least some strict intentions, in particu-
lar those based on the mistaken belief, will be realized.
I believe that the Concurrence Principle would be mor-
ally more sound if construed to require concurrence be-
tween results and only strict intentions. It is not enough
that an intention can be ascribed to an actor, as derivative
intentions can trivially. Insofar as we are rational beings
who actually engage in practical reasoning, strict intentions
play an essential role in our lives. In contrast to derivative
intentions, we are generally aware of our strict intentions
and so consciously embrace them. We may not think in
terms of acting pursuant to various abstract characteriza-
tions of our intentions, such as the intention to kill "a per-
son." Furthermore, strict intentions, as opposed to deriva-
tive ones, play a significant causal role in bringing about
the harmful result. Consider the case of the Nephew who
intends to murder his Uncle and while driving to his Un-
cle's house to carry out his plan, accidentally hits and kills
his Uncle. In this case, there is a concurrence of intention
and result, but we are not inclined to treat the Nephew as a
murderer.' Although the Nephew intended to kill his Un-
cle, this intention did not bring about the Uncle's death in
the manner necessary for the Nephew to be held fully ac-
countable. Similarly, in the Basic Case, the derivative in-
tent to kill a person, although realized, did not bring about
the death of a person in the right way. Thus, in the Basic
person and that a left-handed person was killed. The intention to kill a left-
handed person is not a logically derivative intention of the strict intention either
to kill B or to kill the person on the corner. Yet the intention to kill a left-handed
person fails to play the role in A's practical reasoning that the intentions to kill B
or kill the person on the corner do. In Professor Fletcher's terms, the intention to
shoot a left-handed person is not a "rational motivation" of A's acts and so is not
relevant for determining liability. Cf GEORGE P. F121HER, RHINaING
CR MNAL LAW 160-66 (1978) (proposing a "rational motivation" test for
determining what beliefs about the attendant circumstances of an act should be
incorporated into the description of what the actor is attempting to do).
45. See LAFAVE & SCOTt, supra note 22, at 380 (analyzing the hypothetical
above in a similar way).
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Case, there is a failure of causation: not a lack of proximate
causation between A's act and B's death, but A's intentions
and B's death.
Relying on derivative intentions may lead to results that
are inconsistent with law and our intuitions. A's intention
may be characterized even more abstractly than the inten-
tion to kill a person. In shooting to kill B, A, it may be said,
(derivatively) intended to cause "some consequences in the
world." In the School Children Case, A's bullet, after hitting
C, continues and hits and kills a wild bear that is just about
to kill three school children. The saving of the three chil-
dren is derivatively intended by A, because it is a conse-
quence of his act and A (derivatively) intended his act to
have consequences. Allowing concurrence based on deriva-
tive intentions, A morally should be held as responsible for
the saving of the school children as for the death of C." Le-
gally, A should be able to raise justification as a defense
because the social benefits he (derivatively) intended and
caused outweighed the social harm. This result, however,
conflicts with the law of most jurisdictions. In most juris-
dictions, the fortuitous saving of the school children would
not be counted in A's favor because it was unintended.4
46. I put to the side the question whether the saving of the school children is
too remote a result of A's act to be credited to him. I assume that slightly more
complicated scenarios could be crafted in which proximate cause problems do not
arise for accidentally produced benefits.
47. Cf MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.02-3.08 (requiring at least belief that the
justifying circumstances exist in order to qualify for various justification defenses);
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 22, at 635 ("To have the defense of necessity, the
defendant must have acted with the intention of avoiding the greater harm."). For
an illuminating debate concerning the moral and practical soundness of current
justification law in this regard, see Paul Robinson, A Theory of Justification:
Societal Harm as Prerequisite to Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REv. 266 (1975);
George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr.
Robinson, 23 UCLA L. REV. 293 (1975); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of
Justifications: Deeds v. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY (A.P. Simester &
A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE BASic CONCEPTS OF
CRIMINAL LAW (forthcoming 1998).
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B. Punishment Without Concurrence
Professor Husak has presented the most thorough and
thoughtful analysis to date of the moral implications of TI.
In his article, Transferred Intent,' Husak does not under-
take a lengthy defense of the justness of TI, partly assum-
ing the existence of a consensus in its favor.49 Rather, his
project is to present a rationale for TI that does not depend
on the empty metaphor of "transference of intent." Both
Husak's shorter defense of the merits of the doctrine and
his rationale for it (which indirectly bolsters the doctrine by
providing a theoretical foundation for it) merit discussion.
Husak's theory of TI is of particular interest because it ap-
pears to dispense with the requirement of concurrence of
intended and actual results. Having argued for a particular
interpretation of the Concurrence Principle, in this section I
attempt to justify the requirement of concurrence more
generally.
1. Husak's Defense of TI
Husak begins by considering the "intuitive purist"-the
person who does not believe that A should receive the pun-
ishment for murder. Husak admits the position of the in-
tuitive purist is coherent and plausible.' Nevertheless, he
believes the following "hard case" may persuade some pur-
ists that the result produced by TI is just:
Suppose that Arthur intends to kill two victims. He
is amazed at his good fortune when he sees both his
intended victims in close proximity. He carefully
aims at each, and quickly fires two bullets. Both vic-
tims drop dead. The subsequent autopsy reveals that
the bullet he aimed at his first intended victim hit
and killed the second victim instead, and the bullet
48. Husak, supra note 9.
49. See id. at 71. Although TI is well-established as a matter of positive law,
there is no consensus on its merits in the academic community. See notes 1-9
supra.
50. Husak, supra note 9, at 70.
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he aimed at his second victim hit and killed the first
victim instead.5
Husak states that one who rejects TI would have to con-
clude that Arthur is not guilty of murder-a result with
which he doubts anyone is pleased.
Husak's hard case presents a tempting scenario for the
application of TI. This temptation, however, should be re-
sisted. Husak's hard case seems to support TI only because
it is unclear how the relevant events should be character-
ized. If the scenario should be characterized as Arthur's
engaging in a single action (firing at victim-1 and victim-2)
based on a single intention ("cause the deaths of victim-1
and victim-2"), the opponent of TI can agree that Arthur
should be punished like a double murderer. TI would not be
needed. There would be strict concurrence between intent
("cause the deaths of victim-1 and victim-2") and result
(deaths of victim-1 and victim-2). Just as in the Unintended
Manner of Injury Case, the minor variation in how the re-
sult was accomplished would not be significant. The plau-
sibility of this single-act/single-result characterization ac-
counts for the temptation to impose on A the punishment
for double murder.
Husak, however, may respond by stipulating that Ar-
thur has distinct intentions ("cause death of victim-l" and
"cause death of victim-2") and has engaged in distinct ac-
tions (firing at victim-1 and firing at victim-2)."2 Pursuant
to this stipulation, the opponent of TI must concede that
there is no double murder. So stipulated, however, Husak's
hard case loses its force. Where it is clear that two intentions
are involved, the intuition that the actor should be punished
like a double murderer fades. Consider the Distinct Inten-
tions Case. Arthur sees Bob, shoots at him and misses, and
the bullet kills Charlie. Next year, Arthur, unaware that
51. Id. at 71.
52. Such a stipulation could not be attacked as empty. The criminal law must
have an implicit theory of intention individuation in order to decide such questions
as how many counts of attempted murder should be charged to a person who
shoots three multi-bullet bursts from an automatic weapon.
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Charlie has died, decides to kill Charlie and sends a letter
bomb to his former house. Bob happens to be living at
Charlie's former house and is killed by the bomb. Husak's
hard case, understood as involving two intentions, and my
Distinct Intentions Case are structurally identical. The only
difference is that in the Distinct Intentions Case, the ap-
pearance of a single action based on a single intention re-
sulting in a single result is eliminated by increasing the
time and distance between the relevant events. I find that
once this appearance has been removed, my intuitions re-
garding whether Arthur should receive the punishment for
double murder return to their original anti-TI position: Ar-
thur, in the Distinct Intentions Case and in Husak's hard
case (construed to involve two intentions), deserves to be
punished only for two unsuccessful attempts and perhaps
two instances of manslaughter.
A further counter-hypothetical to Husak's may be
imagined. In this hypothetical, Andre's target practice is
interrupted by his noticing that his sworn enemy, Bret, has
wandered within range and is standing in close proximity to
the target. In quick succession, Andre fires off one shot at
Bret and, resuming his practice, fires one shot at the target.
Bret is killed and the center of the target is hit. A subse-
quent autopsy of Bret reveals what the astute reader has
likely anticipated: that the first shot missed Bret and
struck the target and the second shot missed the target and
struck Bret. In this case, I feel confident that Andre should
be held liable for attempted murder (via his first shot) and
perhaps manslaughter (via his second shot), but not mur-
der. The first shot failed to cause the death of a human be-
ing; the second was not intended to kill. If we are willing to
let the autopsy results persuade us in this case that there
was no murder, but merely (from Andre's perspective) a
lucky bull's-eye and a lucky killing, should we not grant
that Husak's hypothetical is no more than a case of a double
lucky killing, not a double murder?
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2. The Principle of Proportionate Sentencing
Husak does not seek to offer an account of the Basic
Case according to which A intentionally caused the death of
another person. Indeed, Husak in explaining TI, does not
attempt to show that A is, in any significant sense, a mur-
derer. Rather, the key to Husak's theory of TI is that A,
while not a murderer, nevertheless deserves a punishment
as harsh as that a murder deserves.' To reach this conclu-
sion, Husak invokes what he calls the principle of propor-
tionate punishment. According to this principle, the harsh-
ness of the punishment that is due a person is a function of
two variables: harm and culpability. If two people act with
the same culpability and proximately cause the same
amount of harm, they have committed equally serious
crimes and deserve the same punishment. Thus, because A,
like a murderer, (1) proximately caused the death of a per-
son, and (2) intended to cause the death of a person, he de-
serves the same punishment as a murderer.' For Husak,
the principle of proportionate sentencing provides a theo-
retical basis for TI because it generates the results implied
by TI.
The principle of proportionate sentences, upon which
Husak's theory of TI rests, suffers from two flaws. The first
is that the principle is too broad. The principle of propor-
tionate sentences contains no requirement that the harm
caused and the harm intended be of the same type. There
seems no reason to reject the possibility that harms of dif-
ferent types may be equally severe. For example, shooting
someone in the leg might be as harmful as burning a
building. Imagine then that Sam, in attempting to shoot
Don in the leg, misses and hits a hidden gas main causing a
building to explode; Sid successfully shoots Dan in the leg.
According to the principle of proportionate sentences, Sam
should receive the same sentence punishment as Sid who is
successful. Or, to take a more extreme case, imagine that
53. Husak, supra note 9, at 87.
54. Id. at 91-92.
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Joe has sex with a woman he believes to be his sister in an
apartment she tells him she owns. In fact, she is not his
sister and they have entered the apartment without the
permission of the true owner.' If the harm associated with
incest is equal to that of trespass, then according to the
principle of proportionate sentencing, Joe, who has acted
culpably and thereby caused harm, should receive the pun-
ishment for either incest or trespass even though he com-
mitted neither. This is counter-intuitive. The scenario
seems to involve merely the fortuitous overlap of the mens
rea for attempted incest and the actus reus of trespass.
Merely because they are causally connected does not make
that harm and culpability jell into a single moral wrong.
The limitation on transferring intent within a type of harm
is also consistent with existing law.'
The principle of proportionate sentencing would also be
too broad if it does not require that the harm is caused by
the act which manifests the actor's culpable mental state.
Husak does not indicate explicitly whether the principle
contains this requirement, but seems to imply it does not. 7
Assuming it does not, the principle would imply that a per-
son who attempts murder in the morning and accidentally
causes a death in the evening should be punished as a mur-
derer. Such a person would have acted with the same cul-
pability and caused the same harm that day as a person
who committed murder that day. Taken to an extreme, this
approach would warrant the criminal justice system's de-
termining penalties by surveying the total moral reprehen-
sibility of a person's intentions over her lifetime and com-
55. For a hypothetical involving gun possession and bigamy, see ROLLIN M.
PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 922 (3d ed. 1982).
56. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2) (requiring that intent be transferred
only where the harm caused is to a "different person or different property" from
that intended). The classic common law cases are Faulkner (intent to steal which
led to burning of ship not transferred to support liability for arson), and Pembliton
(intent to hit person with stone which led to property damage not transferred to
support liability for malicious damage to property). See supra notes 30-31.
57. See Husak, supra note 9, at 96 (suggesting principle would punish as
murderer a person who wounded his victim, V, and later, mistakenly thinking V
dead, disposed of Vin manner that caused V's death).
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paring them with the total harms caused over her lifetime.
This approach, perhaps reminiscent of inquiries at St. Pe-
ter's Gate, seems wholly foreign to our moral practices.
Finally, the principle is too broad because it would seem
to allow unintentionally caused benefits to become relevant
for punishment. Under the principle of proportionate sen-
tences, culpability and harm determine punishment. Cul-
pability, as the term is ordinarily understood, is a function
of the net consequences intended. If a person in acting in-
tends to cause consequences that are harmful and conse-
quences that produce a greater benefit for society, she will
not be morally culpable and will have an affirmative crimi-
nal defense.' Likewise, it seems to follow that harm should
be a function of the beneficial as well as the harmful conse-
quences of an act. To slightly vary the earlier School Chil-
dren Case, imagine that Art shoots at Ben, kills him, and
the bullet continues to kill the wild bear that was about to
kill one school child, thereby saving a life. In contrast,
Aaron shoots at Bob and misses, hitting nothing. Here, Art
and Aaron have acted with the same culpability (each in-
tended to kill one person) and caused the same net harm
(zero). The principle of proportionate sentences would thus
require that they receive the same punishments. As dis-
cussed earlier, this result conflicts with the law of most
jurisdictions. In most jurisdictions, while Aaron would be
liable for only attempted murder, Art would be liable for
murder. The fortuitous saving of the school child would not
be counted in Art's favor because it was unintended. Al-
though this argument does not demonstrate that the prin-
ciple of proportionate sentences is morally unsound, it at
least shows that its soundness must be argued for and can-
not rest on its alleged consistency with widely established
moral practices.
The various types of overbreadth described above might
be thought to be curable by amending the principle to in-
58. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Justification Generally. Choice of
Evils).
59. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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troduce restrictions for each of the areas of overbreadth. If
more areas are identified, more restrictions may be intro-
duced. Such a strategy, however, would result in a moral
theory with an unappealing ad hoc form. What is missing
from the theory of proportionate sentences is not a variety
of independent restrictions, but a single one: the Concur-
rence Principle.
This point leads to my second criticism of the principle of
proportionate sentences. By failing to incorporate the Con-
currence Principle, the principle of proportionate sentences
fails to account for our retributivist intuitions in a satisfy-
ing manner. TI is a retributivist doctrine. Utilitarians have
little use for TI because of the weak correlation, if any, be-
tween the relatively subtle psychological factors triggering
the doctrine and the relatively small punishment incre-
ments it authorizes on one hand and future net social wel-
fare on the other.' Moreover, TI is an objective retributive
doctrine. 1 According to subjective retributivist doctrines,
only the actor's subjective state is relevant to her desert.
Failed and successful attempts are treated alike. In con-
trast, under objective retributivism, results-such as the
killing of an unintended victim-may matter. Objective
retributivism appears more consistent with existing legal
60. Those with utilitarian leanings have a hard enough to time trying justify
the more straightforward and significant disparity between the penalties for
completed offences and failed attempts. For a reasonably complete attempt to
analyze the economic efficiency of the disparity, see Steven Shavell, Deterrence
and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1990).
61. Subjective retributivists tend to oppose TI on the ground that the chance
killing of an unintended victim should not be relevant to punishment. See A.J.
Ashworth, Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforeseen Consequences, in
RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAw 67, 94 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1978) (stating that the
proper charge for an unintended killing in the course of an attempted murder is
attempted murder). Subjective retributivists object to the current practice of
imposing greater penalties for completed crimes than unsuccessful attempts. TI
has the effect of treating accidentally completed crimes as instances of the former
class. A subjective retributivist would be in favor of TI only if she believed that by
and large the actual penalties for completed offenses were closer to the
appropriate level, as judged by subjective retributivism, than those for failed
attempts. Thus, a subjective retributivist might approve of TI on contingent
grounds.
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practice and common moral intuitions than subjective
retributivism.' Nevertheless, objective retributivism has
come under sharp attack from subjective retributivists."
Although they may comfortably point to the raw moral data
of intuitions and practice that supports their position, ob-
jective retributivists have been hard pressed to explain
why, as a theoretical matter, results should matter. The
principle of proportionate sentencing is woefully unhelpful
in this regard. According to the principle, culpability and
harm, specifically the harm proximately caused by the ac-
tor, simply are the two variables relevant to desert. No clue
is given about what these variables might have in common
that make them the unique variables determining desert or
what their relationship might be. Admittedly, explanations
must end somewhere, and Husak may argue that with the
principle of proportionate sentences we have hit moral bed-
rock. Nevertheless, the principle's two-valued formula, in
simply and starkly positing the relevance of culpability and
caused harm, lacks the theoretic coherence that is a virtue
in a moral theory.
The principle of proportionate sentences would be
strengthened if supplemented with the Concurrence Prin-
ciple. In its supplemented form, the principle of proportion-
ate sentences would provide that an actor's punishment is
a function of culpability and resulting harm so long as the
harm was intended (or known, risked or negligently ig-
nored). To be relevant then, the harm must be the right
sort of harm, where the right sort is determined by the
nature of the actor's culpability. In a nutshell, desert in
62. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (completed offenses punished
more harshly than attempts).
63. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 63-83 (1988);
Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 237 (1994).
64. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 1 (1994); Sanford Kadish, The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 679 (1994); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and
Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974).
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the supplemented theory would go from being a matter of
culpability and harm to a matter of culpability for harm.
The two variables, formerly unrelated, are now connected
within the theory. One advantage of such a supplemented
theory is that some explanation can be given for why re-
sults matter for punishment. Results matter because the
actor is being held responsible for them. Of course, under
Husak's theory, it could be said that an actor is punished
for being culpable and for causing harm. This formulation,
however, suggests that relation of harm and culpability
should be additive: the more of one or the other, the more
punishment deserved. The fact that harm and culpability
can each act as ceilings on desert is better understood by
conceiving of culpability as playing an attributive role:
without enough culpability, harm cannot be attributed; and
without enough harm there is nothing to attribute.
Under an attributive conception of desert, culpability
now fits the harm in a matter that precisely mirrors the
relation between punishment and the conditions of pun-
ishment. Under retributive theories of punishment, if a per-
son commits a murder, he should be punished for that mur-
der.' Justice is not served if the murderer, years later, is
convicted of an unrelated murder that he did not commit.
Just as there should be a concurrence between crime and
punishment, so there should be a concurrence between cul-
pability and harm. We may thus say that a person should
be punished for being culpable for a harm.
C. Other Mens Reas
Consideration of mens reas other than intent offers a
useful perspective on TI. Model Penal Code § 2.03 does not
substantively distinguish between purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence, allowing all to be
"transferred" in like manner. It seems fair to presume that
the validity of such transfers should stand or fall together.
65. For criticism of the expression "punishment for," see Joel Feinberg, Equal
Punishment for Failed Attempts, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 117, 123 n.13 (1995).
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One consideration supporting this presumption is illus-
trated by section 2.03 itself. The attribution of a result to a
person is equally a matter of causal connection to, and cul-
pable attitude toward, the result.' Section 2.03 establishes
the same requirement of proximate causation for all four of
the Model Penal Code's mens reas.' This invariance is
found in existing criminal and tort systems. A unitary set of
standards across mens reas for imputing causal responsibil-
ity suggests a unitary set of standards for determining the
attitudinal component of attribution. The permissibility or
impermissibility of transference is part of this latter set of
standards.'
1. Knowledge
Knowledge provides perhaps the clearest example of a
case where, at least by the standards of ordinary language,
transference does not work. Imagine that in the Basic Case
A is very sure that he will hit B because A has consistently
hit targets at similar distances under similar conditions. A
fires, and having fired, immediately turns to run before no-
ticing that not B, but C has been hit and has fallen to the
ground dead. Based on his experience, A at this time justi-
fiably believes that he has killed someone. Furthermore, A's
belief that he has killed someone is correct. Does A, how-
ever, know he has killed someone? Intuitively, we would say
no--A's belief that he killed someone turned out to be true
in the wrong way, not in the way he thought it would be
66. See FLETCHER, supra note 44, at 491-92 (describing causation as
"objective attribution" and factors relation to culpability as "subjective
attribution").
67. With respect to strict liability offenses, the Model Penal Code requires
that the result be the "probable consequence" of the actor's conduct. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.03(4). Although the change in terminology from the "too remote or
accidental" standard of subsections 2.03(2) and (3) is not explained, the
commentaries give no indication that a substantive change is intended. Id. at cmt.
4,264-67.
68. Tort law applies TI to intentional torts, but not to negligent torts. This
variance, however, seems more the product of the divergent historical roots of
intentional and negligent torts than of any theoretical distinction between them.
See Prosser, supra note 4, at 655-56, 662 (TI developed from and is limited to torts
originating in action on trespass).
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true, but in a merely fortuitous way.' Insofar as we believe
that knowingly causing a harmful state of affairs should be
moral grounds for punishment, A should not be punished on
these grounds because knowledge is not subject to transfer-
ence.
The force of the prior analysis of transferred knowledge
is admittedly diminished when the moral significance of
knowledge is questioned. Often knowledge and responsibil-
ity are related. A claim of knowledge may function as a
means of taking responsibility for any reliance that may be
placed on the speaker's assertion. Belief, in contrast, often
acts as a qualification signaling a take-it-for-what-its-worth
attitude. (Compare "I know I can get us there in time" with
"I believe I can get there in time"). There need be no differ-
ence in epistemic conditions underlying appropriate asser-
tions of knowledge or belief. Yet it is not clear that these
implications of responsibility carry over to the context of
desert. Although the Model Penal Code establishes knowl-
edge as a condition of culpability, it defines it thinly to re-
quire merely a belief that is held with a high degree of con-
fidence."' Without further argument, it is not clear that be-
tween two actors each of whom is practically certain that he
would cause harm, reduced punishment is appropriate for
the actor whose belief is held without justification or oth-
erwise lacks the usual indicia of knowledge."
69. See Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS
121 (1963). The result might be different if the hypothetical were altered so that B
stood upon a very crowded street. In this case, he might believe that if by some
chance he missed B, he would certainly hit someone else. Relying on this altered
hypothetical and this supplementary belief, it might be appropriate to say that A,
having killed C, knew he had killed someone.
70. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b).
71. For example: Mike and Sam are both lazy campers in different forests.
Each is practically certain that if he fails to extinguish his campfire, a forest fire
will result. Neither does and forest fires start. Mike had good reason to hold his
belief: he had made a large fire, the woods were dry, and the wind was blowing
bard. Sam had no reason: none of the conditions for fires were present; Sam just is
paranoid when it comes to fires. Pursuant to the M.P.C.'s definition of knowledge,
each would be liable for arson by virtue of knowingly starting a fire.
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2. Negligence
Tort law's treatment of negligence offers a useful per-
spective on TI. It is commonly said that tort law does not
permit negligence to be transferred. 2 There is at least sub-
stantial authority, based on Justice Cardozo's majority
opinion in Palsgraf,' holding there is not.74 Mrs. Palsgraf
sued a railroad company based on the failure of railroad
guard to use reasonable care in helping a passenger board a
train. The guard had pushed the passenger harder than
necessary, thereby dislodging a package filled with fire-
works that exploded and caused a scale to fall on Mrs. Pals-
graf. The majority in Palsgraf denied liability based on the
reasoning that the guard owed no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf not
to aggressively shove the package-carrying passenger, and
the guard, having breached no duty to Mrs. Palsgraf, thus
could not be liable to her, nor render the railroad, as em-
ployer, vicariously liable. This view of duty pointedly con-
trasted with the dissent's, authored by Justice Andrews.
Andrews agreed with Cardozo that to state a claim in negli-
gence, Mrs. Palsgraf must assert that a duty to her had
been breached. ' Andrews, however, asserted that the guard
owed a duty to "the world at large" not to jostle the passen-
ger.7" When he did so, he breached that duty to everyone,
including Mrs. Palsgraf. For Andrews, the only open ques-
72. Prosser, supra note 4, at 662 ("The attempt to extend the 'transfer' to
negligence met defeat, apparently final, in the Palsgraf case."); see also Moore,
supra note 9, at 286 n.46 (noting tension between TI and jurisdictions following
Paisgrat.
73. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
74. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
286, 286 n.48, 288 (5th ed. 1984) (noting majority of jurisdictions accept Palsgraf
rule and trend is in its favor); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS
655 (2d ed. 1986) (noting Palsgraf view is "prevailing"); B. MCMAHON & W.
BINcHY, IRISH LAW OF TORTS 98-100 (2d ed. 1990) ("After some uncertainty, the
view has prevailed throughout the common law world that the plaintiff must show
that the defendant was in breach of his duty to him and [not to another]").
75. PaIsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103.
76. See id. ("Every one owes to the world at large a duty of refraining from
those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others .... There needs
to be a duty to the one complaining, but this is not a duty to a particular
individual because as to him harm might be expected").
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tion was causation.' Cardozo's opinion constitutes a rejec-
tion of transferred negligence because it held that duties
are person-specific and cannot be "transferred" to even
proximately injured victims. Cardozo's opinion has been
criticized for not addressing questions of "social policy."
But perhaps the opinion is not wholly arbitrary and rests, if
not on policy, on a modicum of principle.
I believe Cardozo's conception of duty is more coherent
than Andrews'. Three facts about the duty of care support
the view that duties run to individuals, not the world as a
whole (or, more plausibly, to the actor's community). First,
duties seem to arise from characteristics that are features
of individuals, not communities. D has a duty not to place P
at risk unreasonably, we might explain, because P possesses
feelings, life plans, moral convictions, rationality, etc. These
characteristics are not the type that communities, as opposed
to their members, may claim. Let us therefore construe An-
drews to assert that duties run to the members of a commu-
nity as a whole. Second, if Andrews is so construed, his posi-
tion seems to imply that the strength of the duty of care var-
ies with the number of persons in the community. Just as an
actor has a greater obligation to keep a single promise (e.g.,
"I shall never drive over 70 m.p.h.") if it is made to each
member of a large group than if it is made to each member of
a small group, so an actor would have a greater obligation to
act with reasonable care if in acting carelessly he thereby
breached a duty to each member of a large community than
if he thereby breached a duty to each member of a small
community. This conclusion is implausible. Persons in
larger communities may have to act with more care or act
77. Such situations, where the plaintiff is unforeseeable, but there is
proximate causation, as well as the converse situations, are possible. For example,
A, who reasonably believes that there is absolutely no chance his gun is loaded,
pulls the trigger while directing the gun toward B. In fact, the gun is loaded and B
is killed. Proximate causation, but no negligence. Or, A unreasonably believes that
there is no chance that the gun is loaded and pulls the triggers while directing the
gun toward B. The bullet misses, B is startled, runs away and is hit by a lightning
bolt. Negligence without proximate causation.
78. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 74, at 287-88.
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with care more often (because of greater community den-
sity), but, in any given situation, they have no greater obli-
gation to act with the care requisite for that situation.
Third, if D's acts place P at risk unreasonably, as a general
matter, only P will be actually harmed and only rarely, if
ever, will all the members of the community be. Because P
is the principal beneficiary of D's complying with the duty,
we should describe the duty as a duty to P, not to the com-
munity at large.'
Even if Cardozo's view of duties makes sense for torts,
should it be "transferred" to the criminal law? The relation
between tort and criminal law is admittedly controversial.'
On one hand, tort and criminal law seem to use divergent
conceptual frameworks and vocabularies. In tort law, duty
and breach are primary concepts, and harm becomes rele-
vant only at the stage of relief. In criminal law, conduct
("actus reus"), culpability ("mens rea') and resultant harm
are the organizing categories. Criminal law is described as
public law, tort as private law. In tort law, the defendant
must be a particularized private entity; in criminal law, the
moving party is the state. Following this line of argument,
Cardozo's conclusions concerning transferred negligence
may seem to carry little weight for criminal law.1 "On the
other hand, it seems that certain features of the criminal
law imply features of tort law, although not vice-versa. For
79. Not every duty must be person-specific like the duty of care. A's duty to
obey the law, for example, might be thought to flow from the fact that A, through
the course of his life, has accepted benefits from society as a whole, produced by
society as a whole. Furthermore, breaking the law might be thought to incite
lawlessness and social instability generally and so to injure society as a whole.
Under these assumptions, the duty to obey the law arguably would run to, if not
the world at large, at least A's society generally. Duties of the type generally
enforced by the criminal law, such as the duty not to take a life, appear to be
person-specific like the duty of care.
For a different and somewhat more elaborate argument in support of
Cardozo's view of tort duties, see ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw
158-64 (1995).
80. See generally The Intersection of Tort and Criminal Law, 76 B.U. L. REV
1 (1996) (symposium on intersection of tort and criminal law).
81. But cf Ritz, supra note 2 (arguing that the criminal law should follow
Palsgraf and reject TI).
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example, if an activity is criminal, it generally gives rise to
liability in tort.' It seems strange that someone could be
jailed for injuring you, but not have to compensate you for
those injuries. Following this line of argument, it would
seem strange to jail a person based on his injuring an un-
foreseen victim under TI where the victim would be pre-
cluded under tort law (A la Cardozo) from obtaining com-
pensation for that injury. Indeed, the impetus for allowing
transference in tort law would seem to be much stronger
than in criminal law. In criminal law, even in the absence
of TI, significant penalties may be imposed on the wrong-
doer based on his recklessness or his failed attempt. In tort,
in contrast, without transference an unforeseeable victim
may be left wholly uncompensated. The "gap" for TI to fill is
much greater in tort law. Yet tort law resists the impulse.
I want to suggest a simple relationship between tort and
criminal law. Tort and criminal law should be understood
as pursuing different visions of justice in response to the
same underlying phenomena: wrongdoing. Wrongdoing, in
criminal law, as much as tort law, should be understood as
relative to a victim. Talk of crime as wrongdoing against
"the public" or "the King's peace," I take to be reducible to
wrongs against particular, if sometimes unidentifiable,
members of the public. Only persons have rights so impor-
tant that their violation might trigger penalties of the se-
verity commonly imposed by the criminal law. In the face of
wrongdoing to persons, tort law is concerned essentially
with corrective justice, criminal law essentially with re-
tributive justice.' Reliance on these different norms ex-
plains the different litigation structures of tort and criminal
law. Corrective justice requires a wrongdoer and a victim to
be participants in the proceeding because the relative posi-
82. Unsuccessful attempts are the only major category of criminal offenses
that do not generate tort liability. Unsuccessful attempts, however, are not true
exceptions to the generalization that criminal liability implies tort liability
because in cases of unsuccessful attempts, there is no injury to compensate for.
83. Punitive damages and forfeiture may represent limited exceptions to this
generalization.
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tion of each has been altered by the wrongdoing." Retribu-
tive justice merely requires the wrongdoer and a neutral
party to impose the punishment. These different remedial
structures, rather the nature of the underlying wrongdoing,
explain the public and private labelings of criminal and tort
law respectively. If, as I have argued above, there is good
reason from a tort perspective not to view a would-be tort-
feasor as a wrongdoer with respect to an unforeseen and
unintended victim, then the same should hold for the
criminal law. Returning to the Basic Case, because A in
harming C did not wrong C, neither a corrective nor a re-
tributive response is triggered by the harm to C. The harm
becomes legally irrelevant. Where there is no underlying
wrongdoing to respond to, tort and criminal law must
equally stay their hands and, to the extent justified by their
different ideals of justice, act only based on the wrong and
harm toB.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article advanced the doctrine of transferred intent
as a vehicle for inquiring into the nature of criminal cul-
pability. In considering the moral soundness of treating one
who harms an accidental victim like one who harms an in-
tended victim, we have been led to examine the distinction
between accidents and mistakes, the nature of intentions,
the requirement of concurrence, the structure of duty, and
the relation of tort and criminal law. The goal of the inquiry
was to achieve an improved understanding of the moral
basis of the criminal law generally. I have suggested that
the criminal law should be understood, at core, as punish-
ing actors for causing harms that were strictly intended or
to which lower levels of culpability apply. This understand-
ing implies the rejection of TI.
84. See Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1239
(1988) (discussing the relation of tort law's substantive goals and its litigation
structure).
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The conception of the criminal law set forth above is un-
doubtedly incomplete. I have not addressed how it might be
revised-as it undoubtedly must be to some degree-in
light of considerations of practical administration and com-
peting social values. Furthermore, I have largely assumed
the validity of an objective, or result-oriented, form of retri-
butivism. The availability of a more compelling explanation
of why results matter morally would obviously aid in decid-
ing what results matter and, in particular, whether deriva-
tively intended harms to unintended victims matter. The
lack of such an explanation, however, need not bar useful
theorizing concerning significant issues that surround and
inform the moral foundations of the criminal law. Or, at
least, so I hoped to have shown.
